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A sense of ownership over one’s own body
is essential for effective interaction with
the world: acting upon objects or commu-
nicating with others relies on distinguish-
ing between the parts of the world that
constitute our self, and the parts of the
world that do not. The sense of body
ownership is frequently associated with
activity in the ventral premotor cortex, in-
traparietal sulcus, and insula (Grivaz et
al., 2017), and is believed to stem from
multisensory integration (Ehrsson, 2012):
congruent sensory signals are combined
to provide a feeling of bodily self that is
distinct from the surrounding environ-
ment. This is emphasized by the rubber
hand illusion (RHI), in which synchro-
nous, but not asynchronous, stroking of a
rubber hand and the real hand (which is
hidden from view) can induce a sense of
ownership over the false limb (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998).
In an article in The Journal of Neurosci-
ence, Spengler et al. (2019) proposed a role
for the amygdala in mediating the sense of
body ownership. In line with the oft-
reported role of this area in threat-related
processing, they hypothesized that the
amygdala may be involved in protecting
against distorted body perception and
that susceptibility to body illusions, such
as the RHI, might therefore be determined
in part by amygdala activity. To test this
hypothesis, they performed three experi-
ments. In the first, they recruited twin
women with bilateral amygdala lesions
(resulting from Urbach–Wiethe disease)
and compared their subjective experience
in the RHI (agreement with statements
about the illusory experience and illusion
onset time) with that of 13 healthy con-
trols. In the second experiment, they ex-
amined whether illusion onset correlated
with amygdala volume in healthy partici-
pants. In a third study, they assessed
responses to the RHI after the administra-
tion of intranasal oxytocin, which has
been found to have an inhibitory effect on
the amygdala (e.g., Martins et al., 2019).
The response of the patients to the RHI
was striking. Both immediately reported
the strongest possible feeling of owner-
ship over the rubber hand. Their onset
time for the illusion was 1 s, whereas the
average onset for control participants was
2 min. In the second experiment, the
authors found a positive correlation be-
tween amygdala volume and illusion on-
set: people with a larger amygdala took
longer to experience the illusion. Finally,
Spengler et al. (2019) found that the ad-
ministration of intranasal oxytocin in-
creased the strength of the illusion and
reduced onset time compared with pla-
cebo, in keeping with other research on
the RHI (Crucianelli et al., 2019). From
these consistent results the authors con-
cluded that amygdala activation and
structural integrity influences susceptibil-
ity to the RHI, and that the amygdala
helps protect the body from potentially
damaging illusory perceptions.
The study by Spengler et al. (2019)
provides insight into potential subcortical
mechanisms underlying the experience of
body ownership. We agree with the au-
thors that the amygdala may help to main-
tain a coherent perception of the bodily
self, but we do not necessarily agree with a
threat-related role for the amygdala in
body ownership. Instead, we believe that
the results are adequately explained by de-
ferring to the classic conceptualization of
body ownership as deriving from multi-
sensory integration.
As previous work has established, the
RHI relies on the manipulation of multi-
sensory signals (vision, touch, proprio-
ception) that contribute to the sense of
bodily self. In addition to these bottom-up
sensory signals, a feeling of body ownership
may be influenced by top-down processes,
such as our expectations of reality (e.g., that
a hand seen extending from the body in a
first-person perspective is very likely to be
one’s own) (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014) or in-
ternal models of our own body appearance
(Tsakiris, 2010). We propose that the
amygdala may help mediate between these
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bottom-up and top-down processes to sup-
port the conscious sense of bodily self.
The amygdala has an established role
in multisensory integration (Ghazanfar
and Schroeder, 2006; Van der Stoep et al.,
2019), a process that is essential to ascer-
tain whether different sensory inputs
share a common source (e.g., a touch seen
on a rubber hand and a touch felt on the
real hand). Multisensory integration oc-
curs in the amygdala even in contexts de-
void of affective content (Morrow et al.,
2019), and this integration is supported by
reciprocal projections to primary sensory
cortical areas (Janak and Tye, 2015), by a
large proportion of neurons responsive to
two or more sensory inputs (Morrow et
al., 2019), and by intrinsic connectivity
between different unimodal subregions
(Benarroch, 2015). Importantly, the amy-
gdala is sensitive to novel multisensory in-
put (Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006),
which means it must also have access to
information about previously experi-
enced or expected sensory input. Notably,
the amygdala is functionally connected to
the posterior parietal cortex, where the
established perception of the body, built
up with experience, is putatively stored
(Longo et al., 2010). It is also functionally
connected to the insula (Roy et al., 2009),
which is involved in bodily awareness
(Grivaz et al., 2017), and it projects onto
the ventral premotor cortex (Ishida et al.,
2018; Rizzo et al., 2018), a region that has
been associated with the experience of
ownership over the false hand during the
RHI (Guterstam et al., 2019). Together,
the functional and anatomical connectiv-
ity of the amygdala suggests that it is well
situated for supporting these cortical ar-
eas that are commonly associated with the
sense of body ownership. This may in-
volve comparing established knowledge
about the own body with ongoing sensory
feedback about the body. If online sensory
feedback conflicts with the stored repre-
sentation of the body, as at the start of the
RHI, it is plausible that one maintains a
feeling of ownership over their real (hid-
den) hand since this is the source of estab-
lished bodily experience. However, as the
synchronous seen and felt touches con-
tinue, it becomes evident that they must
share a common source: one’s own body
(Apps and Tsakiris, 2014). If this occurs,
then the feeling that the false limb is one’s
own can arise. According to this view, the
amygdala may be part of a system that
“gates” conscious bodily self-perception,
limiting the influence of online sensory
information about the body until it is
strong enough to override experience.
Behavioral support for this hypothesis
is found in the incredible speed with
which the amygdala-lesioned patients re-
ported the RHI (Spengler et al., 2019).
This might occur if their conscious per-
ception immediately resolves to the most
likely conclusion given everyday experi-
ence (that a hand viewed from the first-
person perspective is one’s own), or if
their internal body model is immediately
disregarded in favor of the false hand.
This is a plausible outcome if damage to
the amygdala interferes with the ability
to balance top-down information and
bottom-up sensory signals. Indeed, dam-
age to the amygdala or amygdala connec-
tivity can also result in disorders of bodily
self-awareness (e.g., Jenkinson et al., 2013;
Pacella et al., 2019). In healthy partici-
pants, increased amygdala activation was
observed when incongruent multisensory
information was presented during a RHI
paradigm (Tsakiris et al., 2007), further
suggesting that the amygdala is sensitive
to discrepancies between incoming sen-
sory feedback and established sensory ex-
pectations regarding what constitutes the
real body. Effects on the conscious experi-
ence of body ownership in healthy in-
dividuals can also be observed when
amygdala activity is reduced with intrana-
sal oxytocin, or when comparing RHI on-
set with amygdala volume, as reported by
Spengler et al. (2019). The greater the ac-
tivity (or size) of the amygdala, the longer
it takes to resolve conflict between top-
down information and congruent multi-
sensory information arising from the real
and false hands because inconsistency be-
tween different sources of online sensory
information can be more readily detected
(e.g., the asynchronicity of seen and felt
touches). This delays the establishment of
a coherent percept of an owned limb.
Another possible interpretation of the
results is that the amygdala is simply in-
volved in multisensory integration during
the RHI, rather than mediating between
multisensory information and top-down
processes. Indeed, the speed of illusion
onset in the Urbach–Wiethe patients re-
ported by Spengler et al. (2019) could re-
flect an overriding influence of visual
feedback on hand ownership (e.g., Mar-
tinaud et al., 2017) in the absence of mul-
tisensory integration that normally occurs
in the amygdala. Similarly, downregula-
tion of the amygdala in healthy partici-
pants could speed the onset of the RHI by
limiting the sensitivity of the amygdala
to online multisensory conflict, placing
greater weight on the more salient visual
information rather than the conflicting
proprioceptive feedback. If this is the case,
we might expect that decreased amygdala
activity would result in the experience of
ownership over the rubber hand, even if it
was stroked asynchronously with the real
one. Unfortunately, Spengler et al. (2019)
did not perform this classic control test
for the RHI. However, other research sug-
gests that intranasal oxytocin increases the
strength of the RHI only when synchro-
nous stroking is applied to the real and
fake hands, not with asynchronous strok-
ing or purely visual feedback (Crucianelli
et al., 2019). As such, this interpretation
seems less tenable.
In conclusion, we propose that the
findings reported by Spengler et al. (2019)
may reflect a role for the amygdala in me-
diating top-down and bottom-up infor-
mation for the purpose of maintaining a
sense of body ownership. As emphasized
by Spengler et al. (2019), the amygdala is
infrequently reported in neuroimaging
studies of body ownership, which may be
due to its small size. However, it is possi-
ble that cortical areas associated with body
ownership are supported by subcortical
areas, such as the amygdala, and we hope
that further research will investigate the
alternative hypotheses of amygdala func-
tion discussed here.
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Longo MR, Azañón E, Haggard P (2010) More
than skin deep: body representation beyond
primary somatosensory cortex. Neuropsy-
chologia 48:655– 668.
Martinaud O, Besharati S, Jenkinson PM, Foto-
poulou A (2017) Ownership illusions in pa-
tients with body delusions: different neural
profiles of visual capture and disownership.
Cortex 87:174 –185.
Martins D, Mazibuko N, Zelaya F, Vasilakopoulou
S, Loveridge J, Oates A, Maltezos S, Mehta M,
Howard M, McAlonan G, Murphy D, Williams
S, Fotopoulou A, Schuschnig U, Paloyelis Y
(2019) Do direct nose-to-brain pathways un-
derlie intranasal oxytocin-induced changes in
regional cerebral blood flow in humans?
bioRxiv. Advance online publication. Retrieved
February 28, 2019. doi:10.1101/563056.
Morrow J, Mosher C, Gothard K (2019) Multi-
sensory neurons in the primate amygdala.
J Neurosci 39:3663–3675.
Pacella V, Foulon C, Jenkinson PM, Scandola M,
Bertagnoli S, Avesani R, Fotopoulou A, Moro
V, Thiebaut de Schotten M (2019) Anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia as a tripartite disconnec-
tion syndrome. Elife 8:e46075.
Rizzo G, Milardi D, Bertino S, Basile GA, Di
Mauro D, Calamuneri A, Chillemi G, Silvestri
G, Anastasi G, Bramanti A, Cacciola A (2018)
The limbic and sensorimotor pathways of the
human amygdala: a structural connectivity
study. Neuroscience 385:166 –180.
Roy AK, Shehzad Z, Margulies DS, Kelly AM, Ud-
din LQ, Gotimer K, Biswal BB, Castellanos
FX, Milham MP (2009) Functional connec-
tivity of the human amygdala using resting
state fMRI. Neuroimage 45:614 – 626.
Spengler FB, Scheele D, Kaiser S, Heinrichs M,
Hurlemann R (2019) A protective mecha-
nism against illusory perceptions is amygdala-
dependent. J Neurosci 39:3301–3308.
Tsakiris M (2010) My body in the brain: a neu-
rocognitive model of body-ownership. Neu-
ropsychologia 48:703–712.
Tsakiris M, Hesse MD, Boy C, Haggard P,
Fink GR (2007) Neural signatures of body
ownership: a sensory network for bodily
self-consciousness. Cereb Cortex 17:2235-
2244.
Van der Stoep N, Van der Stigchel S, Van Engelen
RC, Biesbroek JM, Nijboer TC (2019) Im-
pairments in multisensory integration after
stroke. J Cogn Neurosci 31:885– 899.
Reader and Crucianelli • Journal Club J. Neurosci., September 25, 2019 • 39(39):7645–7647 • 7647
